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IMPLEMENTATION. THE CASE OF USER CHARGE 
IMPLEMENTATION IN THAILAND 
Montra Leoseng and Willi Zimmermann 
ABSTRACT 
Implementation research is an almost ‘unknown quantity’ Thailand. This research 
project explores the implementation of the user charge for waste water treatment in 
three cities with limited success. The bureaucratic complexity is mostly very high; it is 
reduced by a socio-economic local elite. The implementation often happens within a 
double structure of the State on the one hand the ‘rational legitimate state’, on the 
other, a configuration that resembles a ‘traditional organic state authority’. Legal 
authority and responsibilities are unclear. There are no implementation guidelines or 
proper programs. The management and costing of the user charge is often arbitrary 
which leads to court cases. The deficiencies of the implementation might be 
‘compensated’ by capacity building. However, in a broader context than the user 
charge, the authors argue that a triple paradigm shift - from (i) a traditional to modern 
polity, (ii) command and control to economic policy instruments, (iii) centralized to 
decentralized forms of government - lead to an overload of the policy arena and policy 
implementation failures. These are due to missing skills, knowledge and expertise on the 
part of central government actors and agencies, and to the ‘unpreparedness’ of the 
‘local actors’ and the prevalence of tradition. This message is particularly relevant 
because almost all countries of the Region have engaged in public administration 
reforms.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The current Thai government (year 2004) is introducing modern public sector 
management and continuing the process of decentralization that has been given new 
impetus with the Thai Constitution of 1997. Some policy areas are also experiencing 
shifts, i.e., liberalization and introducing market instruments – among them user charge 
for waste water treatment based on volume and pollution load; this should replace or 
enhance the existing ‘end-of-pipe and command-and-control approach’ based on 
volume of water consumption. These changes have profound impacts on local 
authorities. They are to introduce environmental management and user charges
1
 and 
should improve the still deteriorating environmental conditions and make-up for the 
traditionally weak enforcement of environmental rules and regulations in Thailand 
(OEPP, 1998). With these changes, the country introduces paradigms of almost 
‘universal validity’: good governance, privatization, participation and decentralization 
(for different development paradigms see also Reusse, 2001: 332) and introduces 
market instruments such as user charges in the area of environmental protection (World 
Bank, 1999: 58f).  
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Very little is known about policy implementation in Thailand.
2
 This paper explores 
several issues: 
• It analyzes the implementation process of the user charge in three cities in 
Thailand.  
• It studies the limits of paradigm shifts. Currently, Thailand is in the process of 
three major paradigm shifts. 1) It is shifting from traditional state and 
bureaucracy to a modern participatory democracy as proposed in the new Thai 
Constitution of 1997, 2) Thailand is introducing new policy approaches, for 
example user charges and urban environmental management. Concomitant, 3) 
these policies are introduced within a process of decentralization. This paper 
explores the implications of the triple paradigm shift in the context of Thailand 
and argues that it ‘overloads’ the politico-administrative system.  
The authors believe that the results are of relevance not only for Thailand but also for 
many other countries in the region such as Lao PDR, Cambodia, Vietnam and China. 
They are all in transition from a socialist to a market economy and from central 
command to decentralized governance; in other words, they are all involved in multiple 
policy paradigm shifts. 
 
THE EXPLORATORY RESEARCH PROJECT 
The present project is exploratory empirical research based on the theory of action 
(Barrett and Fudge, 1981; for an overview of the concept of implementation, see Box 
1). It assumes that actors are 
complex; they play a mix of roles. 
Furthermore, the project analyses a 
policy sector (Levi-Faur, 2003: 4) 
and has adopted a de-centered 
analysis of governance that 
encourages the understanding of 
governance in terms of a political 
contest resting on competing ‘webs 
of belief’ and explains these beliefs 
with reference to traditions (Bevir 
and Rhodes, 2001: 24).  
The action-related analysis of real, 
complex situations (Christensen 
and Hansen, 1987; Perry, 1998) is 
done in the form of three 
qualitative case studies, which is 
also considered as a research methodology (Adams and White, 1994; Parkhe, 1993; 
Tsoukas, 1989; Yin, 1993 and 1994). 
This study aims at finding out how the user charge has been implemented in different 
political locations by focusing on the actors that are involved and what effects the 
implementation has on private companies. The independent variables are bureaucratic 
Box 1: Implementation defined  
Implementation is considered a process that includes: 
• implementation as a structure  focusing on 
the actors that participate and collaborate or 
not (Hjern and Hull, 1982; Hjern and Porter, 
1981); 
• implementation as policy management - the 
municipal policy to be re-constructed by 
empirical data collection (Sabatier and 
Mazmanian, 1979); 
• implementation as an outcome focusing on 
the effects produced by policy management, 
the implementation process and the actors 
involved (Fudge and Barrett, 1981); 
• implementation as an evolutionary process 
focusing on the process of the introduction 
of the user charge (Majone and Wildavsky, 
1984). 
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complexity (number and levels of authority involved), the legal authority (authority 
based on clear legal provisions relevant for the implementation of the user charge) and 
the implementation process (explicit process and program). The dependent variable is 
the effect produced on private companies. The general hypothesis is that if bureaucratic 
complexity is low and if the legal authority is based on clear legal provisions, and if 
there is an explicit implementation process, then these factors will lead to the 
introduction of the user charge in the individual companies. These in turn have different 
means of ‘reacting’, either to continue producing as in the past and pay the charge, or to 
introduce measures at input, throughput, and output levels and pay a lower charge than 
without those measures. 
Three qualitative case studies were carried out in the cities of Pattaya, Hat Yai and 
Pattani Province in which the user charge implementation process started in the late 
1990s. The sampling approach is heterogeneous and according to convenience: 
• Pattaya and Hat Yai have the status of municipalities (Population > 200,000 as 
of 2003). Pattani is a PAO (Provincial Administrative Organization, i.e., the 
provincial unit of local self government with a population exceeding 40,000 at 
present);  
• Heterogeneity can also be found in the geographical location: Pattaya is a 
major holiday resort close to Bangkok; both Hat Yai and Pattani are more 
industry oriented and in the South of Thailand; 
• The sectors to be regulated vary too: Mainly food industry in the case of 
Pattani, electronic and rubber industry in Hat Yai, and condominiums and 
hotels in Pattaya; 
• Those in charge of implementing the user charge also differ. In Pattaya it is 
the local authority, in Hat Yai the industrial estate manager, and in Pattani the 
PAO. 
The heterogeneous sampling has advantages: i) an array of problems and successes may 
emerge within the ‘specter of heterogeneity’ and, ii) hypotheses are exposed to a strong 
test. 
Data collection is notoriously difficult in South East Asia. In the present case it was full 
of problems (in 2001 and 2002): In Pattaya the data collection in hotels was stopped due 
to a pending court case and due to ‘undue propositions’ of a key actor towards the 
researcher. However, 11 in-depth interviews with authorities were carried out. In 
Pattani, the 10 in-depth interviews with key implementers and secondary data collection 
had to be made under police protection due to some bombing incidents while the 
fieldwork was executed. The effects of the implementation process upon the companies 
could be investigated in a few cases only. In Hat Yai 7 interviews with authorities and 2 
companies could be carried out. Previous to the data collection directly related to the 
case studies, 11 interviews were done with a politically key figure and representatives 
of the national authorities. 
This article is exploratory. It begins with:  
• a short presentation of the implementation process in the three cases; 
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• then follows an analysis of the major factors that lead to or hinder a successful 
implementation of the user charge;  
• the analysis of the triple paradigm shift;  
• conclusions. 
In this chapter the implementation of the user charge is presented, starting with Hat Yai. 
It is followed by the case study of Pattani. In both cases the user charge implementation 
concerned companies located in industrial estates. While it succeeded in Hat Yai, it 
failed in the Pattani estate. The City of Pattaya, the third case study, has a long tradition 
of central waste water treatment plants and of user charge. The research project looked 
at the extension of the charge to a new target group of users; currently (2003), a court 
case is pending and implementation has been stalled.  
 
HAT YAI: IMPLEMENTATION WITHOUT GOVERNMENT 
Overview 
The user charge has been implemented in the new industrial estate called Southern 
Industrial Estate (SIE, established in 1995; see, key events, Box 2). Among the 29 
industrial estates in 13 Thai provinces, SIE is the smallest one serving the agro-industry. 
SIE covers an area of 0.7 km
2
. In 2002, three companies are operational.  
SIE is part of the Industrial Estate 
Authority of Thailand (IEAT); SIE 
operates the industrial estate in Hat Yai. 
IEAT implements the government’s 
industrial development policy based on an 
Act of 1979. This act is often seen as a 
milestone of user charge implementation 
and established IEAT’s tradition of 
conceptualizing waste water treatment 
plants and applying the Polluter-Pays-Principle (PPP). IEAT is considered to have a 
high political reputation and has been involved in development processes of the region 
as well as of SIE. PPP can have many forms, like flat rates for waste water treatment or 
the user charge. The latter became a major policy approach of the new Governor of 
IEAT in 1995. IEAT announced the implementation of user charge in SIE Hat Yai in an 
official Notification in February 2000.  
Several factors explain the successful implementation. SIE is new and small in terms of 
numbers of companies; it is responsible for the user charge implementation. One strong 
actor, IEAT, is in favor of the charge against strong actors favoring the traditional end-
of-pipe approach; furthermore, the companies have to sign a contract binding them to 
pay the charge. Since the volume of wastewater in future will increase substantially with 
the operational launch of the Rubber City (i.e. Eco Industrial Estate) in 2004, the 
wastewater treatment service and user charge management will play a major role in 
protecting the environment. 
Box 2:  Key events in Hat Yai 
1995 Establishment of SIE 
1995 IEAT: user charge approach 
2000 User charge implementation 
2004 Launch of ‘Eco industrial estate 
and rubber city’ with concerns on 
increasing wastewater volume 
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Bureaucratic Complexity 
The organizational structure that was set up for the implementation of the user charge 
can be characterized as a ‘governmental structure without government’. While IEAT is 
in charge of implementing and supervision of Industrial Estates, SIE has - among many 
tasks - to implement the user charge. IEAT headquarters and SIE have introduced a 
‘soft hierarchy’ that has the characteristics of a network that implements the user charge 
(see Figure 1).  
Figure 1: User Charge Administrative System in SIE (2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ survey, 2002. 
Within IEAT, the Operations Department (OD) is in charge of implementing and 
supervising the operating of Industrial Estates. Among the twelve officials of IEAT are 
three who were given environmentally relevant training and subsequently formed the 
development team (DT) responsible for assisting user charge implementation in SIE. 
Within SIE, three sections are assigned to execute the user charge implementation:  
• The technical team from the Environmental and Safety Section. 
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• A marketing officer is to provide information to factories.   
• The senior engineer from the One Stop Service Section has assumed the role, 
only at the very beginning of implementation, to represent SIE and work with 
IEAT in designing the user charge. 
IEAT and SIE are linked by what has been dubbed by interview partners as ‘Symbolic 
Guiding Team’. It is composed of the IEAT Deputy Governor and the Director of SIE. 
This coalition never went beyond some planning of the user charge and due to one 
meeting only, would not have been able to develop a user charge culture and 
implementation program. However, it was politically important by clearly leading 
towards user charge implementation. 
Given this configuration one may conclude that the bureaucratic complexity is low: One 
actor – IEAT – from the national level and one in situ – SIE – are involved and succeed 
in implementing the user charge.  
However, IEAT’s PPP approach in form of user charge might have been diverted due to 
the fact that SIE had four directors in four years and that SIE’s person in charge of the 
implementation was rotated to another position. Furthermore, SIE’s contacts with the 
factories were minimal and unsystematic. Hence the question is why the charge 
succeeded.  The answer lies in a network of personal relations. IEAT’s Governor had 
one highly qualified employee from DT who was also member of the ‘Symbolic 
Guiding Team’ and who had good, on-going personal relations with SIE. He is the ‘de 
facto authority’ backed up by IEAT’s long tradition of PPP and by its Governor (in 
2000) taking the lead in pushing through the charge. This was done on the basis of one 
crucial legal provision. 
Legal Authority 
The analysis reveals that the environmentally relevant legal provisions are many. 11 
notifications from national agencies are technical and 2 are more managerial oriented: 
• The regulation notifications are very general regarding the user charge, 
making no references to costing and providing little information on how to 
implement the charge. There are no other provisions or guidelines available 
that would help authorities, Estate managers and companies understand the 
charge and its strengths and weaknesses and approach to implementation. 
• The provisions are such that in the end, not the local actor (SIE) but IEAT is 
in the strong position to deal with user charges. IEAT makes the companies 
sign a contract that commits them to pay a user charge.  
• The relations between IEAT and Ministry of Industry (MOI) determine what 
‘interpretation of legal provisions’ and course of action is to be taken:  the 
construction and management of a central waste water treatment plant 
(CWWTP) coupled with a user charge.  At first hand this is not quite obvious.  
IEAT has the authority to act independently by taking into consideration the Ministry of 
Industry, SIE and the factories. This ‘troika’ contests the user charge; according to them 
the existing legal references to the user charge are very general only and the 
Notifications refer to the traditional end-of-pipe approach based on water consumption. 
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 6  ·  Issue 1  ·  2005  ·  © International Public Management Network 
29 
 
The factories use the regulatory vagueness and interpret it in their own way by arguing 
that the user charge is not necessary and the traditional approach is appropriate. SIE as 
an organization is indeterminate. Thus, the question: Why did IEAT, having so far 
applied the PPP but not the user charge in SIE, introduce the charge in SIE Hat Yai 
though there was considerable legal uncertainty and opposition? Two major factors 
contributed to the successful implementation. On the one hand there was the contract 
between factories and IEAT to pay the charge. On the other hand, the operation of 
CWWTP of SIE had started. Its operation and maintenance cost were revealed to be 
expensive. It needed financial means. Since SIE could charge IEAT for these financial 
shortcomings, IEAT notified SIE and the companies in 2000 that it would levy the 
charge through SIE.  
User charge management and effects 
Thus, the general conditions for implementing the user charge were not very favorable. 
There was hardly any communication between IEAT, SIE and the factories regarding 
the user charge. SIE had manifold implementation strategies for it had not clearly 
defined priorities and distributed responsibilities, tasks and resources. Since there was 
also lack of clear leadership in SIE, no implementation program existed and contacts 
with factories remained unsystematic. There was no formula developed on how to 
calculate the charge of an individual factory and relate it to the costs for operation and 
maintenance of the CWWTP. IEAT did the budgeting for ‘running CWWTP’ 
independently of SIE; user charge revenue went to IEAT who then transferred money 
back to SIE for running the CWWTP. In case of a possible budgetary surplus stemming 
from user charge revenue, it was not clear to SIE, what the surplus should be used for; 
similarly, there were no criteria for SIE on how deficits should be compensated for. 
This indeterminate management has the effect that individual members of SIE deal with 
individual companies independently of any common approach or strategy, leaving 
among companies the impression that user charge costing and levying are arbitrary. 
The opinions of the two factories about the implementation process are fairly negative: 
No specific efforts had been made to share information and jointly create a basis of 
information and understanding of the user charge, or, how SIE would strengthen the 
companies’ commitment for the user charge program. There were too few workshops 
and too few meetings with representatives from central government, municipality, IEAT 
and SIE staffs. Users remained in a ‘situation’ of unclear rules and regulations, of 
charge calculation, of testing results and who is ‘in charge’, leaving them with the 
uneasy impression of arbitrariness. 
In the two companies, many believe that the user charge does not really reduce 
environmental pollution and is not very effective. The changes in enterprises are said to 
be slow, depending more on the type of factory: One company is large in terms of high 
loads of wastewater (and higher average user charge per month) and differentiated in its 
structure and functions with a clear written environmental policy. It introduced changes 
in the production process and management of the company However, company 
management believed that these changes had been triggered by its headquarters and 
respective company culture in Bangkok and not by the user charge implementation in 
SIE. The small company has not introduced any changes. 
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In conclusion, IEAT and the management of the Southern Industrial Estate introduced 
the user charge. Bureaucratic and legal authority complexities were low, and policy 
implementation was clearly outcome-oriented which seems to have some positive 
effects. 
 
PATTANI INDUSTRIAL ZONE: END-OF-PIPE SUCCEEDS 
Overview 
The then Prime Minister, General Prem Tinsulanonda, planned to bring together the 
factories that are scattered along Pattani Bay 
(375 km
2
) and to develop an industrial zone 
in the early 1980s (see key events in Box 3). 
Subsequently, the 5
th
 National Economic and 
Social Development Plan 1982 – 1986 
(NESDP) promoted the development of 
Pattani Industrial Zone (PIZ) for attracting 
the seafood and Halal food industry (‘lawful’ 
food for Muslim consumption). Industrial 
Estate Authority of Thailand (IEAT) is asked 
to prepare a master plan with a Central 
Waste Water Treatment Plant (CWWTP) on 
its agenda. Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) is designated with 
responsibility for PIZ project implementation. In 1992 another project takes shape: The 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) economic zone is created to 
further the development of the area by also implementing cleaner industry. The Pattani 
Industrial Zone Environmental Improvement Plan (PIZEI) is developed and PAO starts 
building the CWWTP in 1995. Due to budget constraints, the construction is not 
finished until 2002; the factories are not connected to CWWTP. The user charge is not 
implemented in PIZ; there will be an end-of-pipe approach based on water consumption 
once CWWTP starts operating. This approach succeeded despite the fact that IEAT was 
involved in planning and implementing PIZ – IEAT has been successful in 
implementing the charge in the industrial estate of the neighboring city of Hat Yai (see 
the case study above).  
Since the beginning of its development PIZ has been associated with seawater pollution 
and it is still a large emitter of lead and organic matter into the Pattani River and Pattani 
Bay. In 2002, there are 32 factories in PIZ: 8 are in the process of signing a contract 
with PIZ to start their operation, 3 have been closed while 22 are very small scale 
investment projects only. This does not quite match with the expectations of the 
different plans and projects and pollution continues. 
Bureaucratic complexity 
For planning and implementing CWWTP bureaucratic complexity is high. This is 
particularly true when PIZ was identified as an industrial satellite town to Hat Yai in 
1992. At that time the government called on the Southern Border Provinces 
Box 3: Key events in Pattani 
1980 Developing an industrial 
zone 
1982-1986 Establishment of PIZ in the 
5th NESDP 
1992 IMT-GT: PIZ  becomes the 
industrial satellite town 
1995-2000 PIZEI leads to CWWTP 
construction 
2002 Debates on seawater 
pollution  continue 
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Administrative Center (SBPAC) to intervene in PAO Pattani Province and reduce PIZ’s 
environmental and sea pollution. SBPAC (in the period of 1981-2001) was an inter-
government agency under the Ministry of Interior (MoInt) composed of representatives 
from different ministries that advises southern provinces on matters of economic, social 
and administrative affairs and promotes IMT-GT. SBPAC is also the decision center of 
the different development projects. The Governor of Pattani Province is a member of 
SBPAC (1992-1996), he then becomes the SBPAC Director General (1999 - 2000) and 
is later promoted to Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Interior (2001).  
While working in Pattani, the Governor had a double function: as Governor of the 
Province he headed the executive branch of PAO and was Director of SBPAC. He 
worked with a comprehensive ‘professional’ network consisting of Macro Consultants 
Co., Ltd, with members from the Prince of Songkhla University (PSU) and with the 
Ministry of Interior. This policy arena was mainly interested and motivated in 
developing the physical infrastructure that serves the growth of the IMT-GT economic 
zone. Work focused on the physical planning of CWWTP by Macro Consultants 
supervised by MoInt. They all favored MoInt’s end-of-pipe approach based on water 
consumption. 
Figure 2: Organizational Implementation Structure of PIZEI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ survey, 2002. 
As in the case of SIE in Hat Yai, IEAT is also involved in Pattani. It had originally 
taken over the responsibility of PIZ’s design (in the beginning of 1980s) and was in 
favor of applying the polluter-pays-principle. When the new Governor of IEAT 
assumed responsibility in 1995, he was advocating the user charge and succeeded in 
implementing it in Hat Yai. Thus, one would assume that IEAT should have been the 
key policy stakeholder for the development and implementation of PIZEI starting in 
1995. IEAT did not succeed, for the Provincial Governor was able to twice mobilize 
financial support from Central Government and get the end-of-pipe approach through: 
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1. The Provincial Governor uses SBPAC and its links to MoInt, the Cabinet and 
Prime Minister (see Figure 2 above) to mobilize a national government 
allocation (USD 15 million approximately) that flows to PAO and is used to 
finance the construction of CWWTP.  
2. The construction of CWWTP has not been finished in 2002 and the budget has 
been spent. In 2003 the PAO succeeds in getting further financial resources by 
mobilizing local members of the National Parliament (MPs) and their links to 
Cabinet and the Prime Minister.  
In both cases IEAT did not succeed in linking this funding with the user charge. IEAT 
acts as an advisor of industrial estate development and to PIZ. As far as the revenue 
generation for waste water treatment is concerned, the user charge did not play any role. 
It did not appear in PAO’s mission statement. This was an important argument for 
fending off any claim that it should be introduced. Furthermore, PAO captures the issue 
supported by the local MPs as well as by Pattani Entrepreneur Network (PEN) 
consisting of business organizations and factories. The consensus in this small local 
political economic policy arena was for pre-treatment of waste water at factory level. 
PAO, lead by the Governor can act alone for it is very powerful in terms of financial 
resources. 
The financial support from Central Government ‘flew’ into PAO’s budget and it is 
empowered to: 
• construct and operate PIZ including CWWTP;  
• impose fines for misbehavior of factories, for example in cases of pollution; 
• do contracting (e.g. the wastewater plant construction);  
• engage in land  leasing. 
However, this small policy arena has not been very effective, a fact that has also been 
confirmed in several interviews. Construction of CWWTP started in 1995 and was 
not finished by 2002. Connections of factories by pipelines only began in 2002 (see 
Table 1). For the time being, none of the factories is connected to CWWTP and they 
discharge their pretreated waste water into the sea. Yet, completion of pipelines, the 
operation of CWWTP and the revenue generation are uncertain, for there is a legal 
problem with the land on which the CWWTP has been built. 
Table 1: PIZEI Work on Waste Water Treatment of PAO  
Starting 
Year  
Project Approximate 
budget(s) in 
MLN Baht 
Status in 2002  CWWTP 
involvement 
1995 1
st
 phase of CWWTP 
construction 
40 Completed IEAT/ PAO 
1999 2
nd
 phase of CWWTP 
construction  
22 Completed IEAT/ PAO 
2002 Start the construction of 
pipeline connections from 
factories to CWWTP 
3 On-going PAO 
2003 CWWTP maintenance 
(cost per year) 
10 On-going PAO 
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Note: 1 million Thai Baht (THB) equal to 23,810 USD/ 2004.  
Source: Authors’ survey and interviews, 2002. 
 
Implementation based on legal ambiguity 
The legislative environment of PIZ is complex, since CWWTP has been built on a 
contested piece of land, and due to the ambiguity of the rules and regulations that are to 
be applied. This has consequences not only for the ownership of the land but also for the 
management of CWWTP. Furthermore, an eventual implementation of a user charge is 
tied by three existing legal acts (See Table 2 below) which are all contested. 
Table 2: PIZ Legislative Environment  
Act Agency in charge  Legal challenge 
Ratchaphatsadu Land 
Act of 1975 
The Treasury Depart-
ment (TRD, Ministry 
of Finance) 
The ownership of PIZ land belongs to TRD 
which is responsible for formulating 
policies, guidelines, and procedures for 
managing, maintaining, and utilizing state 
property and obtaining benefits from the 
land through leasing. 
Ministry of Interior 
Act of 1979 
Ministry of Interior PAO is assigned to handle the management 
of Pattani Industrial Zone (PIZ). The PAO 
has executive power to collect the rental fee 
from residential areas, harbor services and 
from PIZ.  
PAO Act of 1955 PAO, Pattani PAO is enabled to assume the 
environmental responsibility referred to by 
the PAO Act of 1955.   
Source: Authors’ survey, 2002. 
The following comments illustrate the legal ambiguities: 
• The Ratchaphatsadu Land Act 1975 does not refer to industrial zones and the 
property rights remain with Treasury Department (TRD). It considers PAO as 
a simple advisory group that has no legitimate power to represent and act on 
behalf of TRD and it has not yet (2002) made any firm decision about the 
scope of the environmental management, i.e., whether a wastewater charge is 
to be collected or not.  
• Ministry of Interior Act of 1979 does not clearly mention that the PAO is 
entitled to collect a user charge; it only speaks of rental fees.  
• The PAO Act of 1955 summarizes the environmental responsibility of local 
organizations which enable PAO to improve the natural resources and care for 
the environment. This Act was revised in 1997 and it now encourages the 
private sector to participate in management and environmental problem 
solving, and targets the increase of local revenues by providing environmental 
services. However, it is applicable only if the local government has the 
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personnel that have the knowledge and capability of environmental 
management. 
Thus, the legal authority of PAO is questionable: PIZ land is TRD land. PAO became 
authoritative in decision-making despite having supported the construction of CWWTP 
without a clear legal basis for the land title and without having a clear mandate for any 
type of rate for water consumption or user charge as advocated by IEAT. For taking 
these decisions, PAO relied mostly on the Governor of Pattani Province and also on 
PEN. It captured the issue and solved it in its own way. 
The user charge has not been taken into consideration since the beginning of PIZEI 
construction, and has not been implemented also due to the argument from PAO and, 
PEN that the opportunities for foreign investment and the growth of the IMT-GT project 
should not be hampered by charges. Finally, PAO was assumed by the MoInt Act of 
1979 to be the center for contracting, and to be the provider of facilities and the user 
charge collector, all tasks in which they had little (administrative) experience. PAO 
officials also did not have a professional business background. Their situation was even 
more difficult because there was further pressure from society and business alleging 
corruption related to CWWTP construction.  
The user charge from the point of view of the companies 
Results of the study indicate that the implementation of PIZEI did have the effect that 
the companies have their own on-site wastewater treatment. However, some do not have 
enough capacity and still discharge waste water directly into Pattani River or Bay.  
From the viewpoint of the factories, PAO alone dealt with the implementation of waste 
water treatment. Though the planning and construction process of CWWTP lasted for 
almost a decade, the user charge was never discussed and is considered too new an idea 
by the managers of factories. Several interview partners consider that it is impossible to 
find a consensus among the stakeholders and set up a mechanism for introducing and 
operating the user charge. The interview partners believe that the major part of PAO’s 
budget was allocated for CWWTP only, a construction that the local government could 
not afford to operate and consequently ran into deficits, particularly due to the high 
electricity costs. Several representatives of factories believe that the cause of the failure 
of the wastewater management system is PAO: it seems to know little about 
environmental management and also lacks the knowledge about the realities of user 
charge and other business matters. From the factories’ viewpoint, unclear rules and 
regulations appeared to be the major constraints in applying the user charge. They also 
believe that the user charge would be too high and that the IEAT user charge formula 
does not seem to suit agro-food production that uses water intensively. 
In conclusion, the user charge issue is captured by a small local political economic 
arena that manages policy implementation by going for pre-treatment and end-of-pipe 
approaches. Bureaucratic complexity is low while legal complexity is high, due to 
uncertainty whether any rate or user charge can be levied. The implementation was 
outcome oriented by avoiding the user charge. Its effects are uncertain.  
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CITY OF PATTAYA:  HIGH COMPLEXITY LEADS TO SOCIO-POLITICAL 
ACTION 
Context 
The City of Pattaya (CoP) has had the privilege of early decentralization. Apart from 
Bangkok it is the only city that has a special form of local self-government with greater 
independence and administrative flexibility sealed in the City of Pattaya Act of 1978.  
The tremendous development and 
economic growth of the Eastern 
Seaboard in 1980s (Box 4) and of 
Pattaya have also their price in form 
of environmental degradation, 
primarily wastewater and seawater 
pollution, solid waste disposal and 
flooding problems.  One could not 
claim that CoP did not work on its 
environmental problems. It 
constructed Central Waste Water 
Treatment Plants (CWWTPs, see 
Figure 3 below) and introduced a user charge in major parts of the city in 1991. The 
users are hotels and condominiums
3
 within the geographical service areas of CWWTP 
1, 2, 3 in Southern Pattaya, Jomtien, Northern and Central Pattaya. A small policy arena 
is the foundation of the success of user charge implementation.  
Under the prescription of new National Environmental Quality Act (NEQA 1992) the 
extension of the user charge should have started in 1999 and cover all CWWTPs and 
users and for the first time polluters in whole area of CoP should have been included in 
the policy formulation. That has led to the formation of large policy arena. However, a 
small policy arena ‘captures the issues’ and constructs a new CWWTP (number 4) 
under dubious circumstances that has retarding effects on the extension of the user 
charge and leads to a court case in 2004. The present case study analyses the extension 
of the user charge. 
Bureaucratic Complexity 
The following three actors have dominated the Waste Water Treatment arena in the CoP 
in the past three decades and they have been relevant for the extension of the user 
charge in 1999 (see Figure 3 below): 
• The National Environmental Board (NEB), 1977-1983 
• The Ministry of Interior (MoInt), 1983 – 2001 
• The Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (MOSTE), 1992 – 
present 
 
 
Box 4: Key events in Pattaya 
1978 The City of Pattaya Act: early 
decentralization 
1980-1988 Eastern Seaboard project & 
configuration of small policy arena 
1991 User charge implementation 
1992 NEQA & configuration of large 
policy arena  
1999 User charge extension begins 
2004 Hotel owners file court case 
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Figure 3: Major Actors, Policy Formulation & Milestones 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ survey, 2002. 
These three major actors from the Central Government have each built ‘its CWWTP’. 
The analysis shows that each had its own strategic approach: 
• When NEB built its CWWTP in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the user 
charge was not an issue in Thailand. It had a top down approach coupled with 
end-of-pipe technology.  
• MoInt built and operated its CWWTP four years after the shutdown of the 
plant built by NEB. MoInt was helped by experts for planning and building 
CWWTP 2 and 3. It introduced the user charge in 1991 by creating for the first 
time a ‘user charge culture’ that could be a benchmark in Thailand and could 
also be applied by MOSTE in the case of its extension in Pattaya in 1999. 
• MOSTE built its CWWTP (number 4 in the Figure above) in 1999 that 
covered all of Pattaya. It also wanted to create a user charge arena that was 
initially inclusive; it includes up to 55 actors from different levels of 
authorities as well as academic and private actors. They form the large policy 
arena (See Figure 4 below). 
 
 
 
1
st
 User charge policy (MoInt) 
1
st
 CWWTP (1982) 
2
nd
 CWWTP (1986) 
Completely shutdown in 1999 
 Pattaya City Act (1978) 
USER CHARGE IMPLEMENTATION (1991 – MoInt) 
4th CWWTP (2001) 
Construction is completed 
2
nd
 User charge policy (MOSTE) 
3
rd
 CWWTP (1994) 
End of operation in 2001 
End of operation in 2001 
USER CHARGE EXTENSION (1999 - MOSTE) 
 
No user charge policy (NEB) 
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Figure 4: Large Policy Arena (simplified) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ survey, 2002.  
MOSTE is the major actor from the national level providing for financial resources. It 
tries a new policy formulation and implementation approach by integrating many actors, 
in particular also those from the local level and business associations into which CoP 
and its Departments are embedded. The central actor within CoP is the Sanitary 
Engineering Division (SED). It was already crucially involved in the construction of 
CWWTP 1, 2 and 3. At that time MoInt had given SED the responsibility and 
accountability for contract negotiations for CWWTP 1, 2 and 3, for the inspection of 
waste water quality and for billing. According to SED’s own definition, it considered 
itself as an independent technical team – also in the case of CWWTP 4 and user charge 
extension in 1999. 
The Director of SED (an engineer) acts as the core coordinator of CWWTP 4 project. In 
order to fulfill its obligations and according to its ‘self-definition’ regarding CWWTP 4 
SED carries out a broad spectrum activities such as: 
• Serve as a local contact point for the wastewater management and user charge 
system. 
• Prepare the strategic environmental planning independent from the central 
government. 
• Monitoring of payment of waste water charges and the submission of reports 
to fiscal authorities. 
• Arrange the environmental training to pursue the success of user charge 
implementation. 
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SED’s approach can be defined as ‘business-like-model’ because at local level 
CoP/SED interact on a peer-to-peer basis rather than in the hierarchy mode; the model is 
open to local actors and individual users with information exchange and direct 
communication (see also below).  
The policy arena is large and highly complex and one could expect that it would 
produce the well known implementation deficits in Thailand. This was not the case in 
Pattaya. A small policy arena captures the issue, brings the construction of CWWTP 4 
to an end and prepared the extension of the user charge. This small arena is composed 
of political economic actors, mainly the local strongman of the Eastern Seaboard 
Project, Mr. X, with a ‘godfather-like influence’. He has traditional personal links to the 
national level, he belongs to the same political party as the Prime Minister who 
established the Eastern Seaboard in the early times of decentralization in the 1980s and 
played a central role in the user charge implementation of 1991 (see Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Small Policy Arenas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ survey, 2003. 
In terms of formal politics, Mr. X is elected mayor (1989) of a small Saensook 
municipality near CoP. He has for two decades informally dominated political life 
throughout the Eastern Seaboard region including Pattaya; he also owns a large business 
and media empire. His links to the national level enable the construction of CWWTP 2 
and 3; once they had difficulties in operation and management, further CWWTPs were 
necessary to save CoP from waste water policy failure, for Pattaya was declared an 
environmental protection zone in 1992. It was important to get the tourist resort out of a 
still lurking environmental crisis. At that time – 1999 - another political party provides 
the Prime Minister. However, Mr. X is able to switch to MoInt with his son as Deputy 
Minister, later to MOSTE with his son being its Minister; the latter Ministry becomes 
the major financier of CWWTP 4 (See Figure 5 above). Mr. X has the support of a 
prominent group of Members of Parliament known as the Group of 16. Mr. X and this 
group organize themselves and create a network and culture of their own design through 
his media power. This small political economic policy arena builds and operates 
CWWTP 4. Currently (2004), Mr. X has been jailed for 5 years and 4 months for 
corruption (Bangkok Post, 2004: 2). He and several of his colleagues managed to buy 
land on behalf of CoP in order to build a waste dump that would also serve CoP. He has 
also been jailed for 25 years for hiring killers who ‘finished off’ one of his rivals. The 
question remains, whether the user charge has been extended or not? Legal matters and 
management strategy prevented it so far. 
Policy arena for 1991 user charge implementation Policy arena for CoP user charge extension in 1999 
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The Eastern Seaboard Development  
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(Chartthai Party) 
SON OF MR. X 
Deputy Minister of MoInt  
Minister of MOSTE  
 
COP 
 
COP 
Mr. X  
Local Political Strongman                 
Key supporter of Chartthai Party 
 
MR. X  
Local Political Strongman  
With MPs Group of 16 from Chartthai 
Party & Media 
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 6  ·  Issue 1  ·  2005  ·  © International Public Management Network 
39 
 
Legal Authority 
The ‘business like model’ is also adequate to define how legal authority is constituted. 
The ‘usurpation of legal power’ by the small policy arena and the reduction of the 
complexity of the large policy arena were possible due to legal uncertainty. The 55 
actors and agencies that form the large policy arena all have their legal provisions, 
definitions and standards. This creates a large array of legal provisions that were neither 
streamlined nor harmonized, thus not establishing a clear legal hierarchy that would set 
up a responsible and accountable legal authority. A legal market is constituted, 
continuously evolving and at the time of CWWTP 4 and user charge extension clearly 
an over-regulated market. This is the key feature of user charge implementation in CoP 
in 1999. 
Legal uncertainty in form of competing interpretations exists and leads to a 
‘politicization’ of the matter: The small policy area establishes itself which allows 
CoP/SED to continue assuming responsibility, implementing and operating the user 
charge and its extension.  CoP resides with the financially powerful MOSTE to deal 
with its environmental crisis. This configuration has low organizational and legal 
complexity (few actors, few rules). However, the business-like model was initially 
inclusive, it allowed private actors (e.g. hotel managers etc) to participate too. But, what 
exactly a user charge and its extension meant (e.g. costing approach, implementation 
and participation procedures) has not been dealt with in the legal acts, nor are clear cut 
interpretations offered. The target groups (hotels etc) have not been consulted and 
informed; no common ‘user charge culture’ has been created by means of workshops, in 
situ visits coupled with advice etc. In this sense the implementation of the extension of 
the user charge is not systematic. This leads to difficulties in the management of the 
user charge. 
Management of user charge 
The user charge is extended through negotiations on a case by case basis depending on 
personal relations, i.e., guided by the approach the respective representatives from 
CoP/SED have in mind. The charge is negotiable and the costing approaches differ from 
user to user. In this way the complexity is increased and opens up a market for 
negotiation which again corresponds to the business-like model. Currently, not only Mr. 
X is in prison but a court case is pending, filed by a user who feels being treated 
arbitrarily regarding the calculation of the user charge. It remains to be seen, how the 
court decides and how the extension will be handled and whether the environmental 
crises can be averted (no specific information available by beginning of 2004). It also 
remains to be seen how CoP can cover its O&M cost for CWWTP 4. 
In conclusion, bureaucratic and legal complexity are initially high for the policy arena is 
inclusive and implementation is considered to be evolutionary. A local political 
economic arena reduces bureaucratic and legal complexity and uses a ‘mechanistic’ 
policy extension management approach to build and operate the CWWTP. The 
extension is uncertain due to a court case.  
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FACTORS FOR SUCCESS OR FAILURE AND EFFECTS                                                    
OF USER CHARGE IMPLEMENTATION 
Factor a: Bureaucratic complexity of implementation 
Implementation complexity
4
 for the planning and construction of CWWTP and of the 
user charge varies considerably in the different case studies. 
Complexity is low in the case of Hat Yai. The policy arena is a symbolic coalition 
guiding team which is a product of the IEAT bureaucratic system and its tradition of 
favoring PPP that includes economic instruments such as the user charge. 
IEAT forms the guiding team with representatives from the two levels: from the 
national level, the IEAT Governor and representatives from its headquarters and from 
the local level, i.e. the Director of the Southern Industrial Estate (SIE). This team 
provides ‘administrative support’ for the implementation of the charge. There is a high 
rotation of the directors of SIE; no formal user charge program and structure are set up. 
Individual members from SIE deal with individual companies and determine the charge 
to be paid. There are only a few companies using this new estate; they have to sign a 
contract that commits them to pay a user charge. Thus, the bureaucratic as well as the 
thematic complexity (user charge approach only) are low. It is higher when it comes to 
the determination of the charge to be paid, depending on the individual members of SIE 
and their relations to the company. 
Bureaucratic complexity is initially higher in the case of Pattani. A considerable number 
of important actors from different levels of hierarchy were involved in getting the 
traditional end-of-pipe approach through. IEAT was also engaged. While it was 
successful in implementing the charge in Hat Yai, it ‘failed’ in Pattani, where it faced a 
strong coalition composed of actors that are from the national, provincial and local 
levels. Some agencies are private, others are public, (PAO, Cabinet, SBPAC, PM, 
MoInt etc), some are academic (Prince of Songkhla University) and, last but not least, 
several are politicians from the local and national assemblies. However, this complexity 
is reduced through the constitution of a small political-economic policy arena: The local 
PAO, supported by local politicians sitting in the national parliament have direct links 
to the national level, i.e., the Cabinet and PM, that enables this small arena to mobilize 
resources for CWWTP and push the end-of-pipe approach through.  
A similar process of reduction of complexity takes place in the case of the City of 
Pattaya (CoP), where the user charge is extended into further areas of the city. Initially, 
actors representing different levels of hierarchy and interests form a large policy arena 
with up to 55 agencies, thus the policy arena is highly inclusive and complex. However, 
complexity is reduced to a small political economic policy arena consisting of a long-
standing regional strongman (‘godfather’) with direct links to his son, the Deputy 
Minister of MoInt and who became the Minister of MOSTE, links to CoP and links to a 
group of 16 MPs from Chartthai party. These links enable the mobilization of central 
government resources for the construction of a new CWWTP that replaces the old ones 
that have broken down or where the scale of operation is insufficient. This small policy 
arena is a product of a regional strongman with business interests in the media, a major 
construction company and other businesses, and who is leading the consortium of local 
leaders. The large policy arena is superseded by the local-politics-model cum business-
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model. The small policy arena makes use of its political economic status to extend the 
user charge in the case of Pattaya; this should reduce the financial problems of CoP and 
stop the environmental degradation that ‘endangers’ the economic thriving of this 
famous tourist resort. However, the regional strongman has been jailed for 5 years and 4 
months for corruption (Bangkok Post, 2004: 2). He and several of his colleagues have 
managed to buy land on behalf of CoP in order to build a waste dump that would also 
serve CoP. He has also been jailed for 25 years for hiring a killer to do away with one of 
his competitors. 
In conclusion, user charge implementation in the three case studies 
• Succeeds, if bureaucratic complexity is very low with the IEAT leadership in 
favor of it (Hat Yai). 
• Succeeds, if political economic actors reduce initially high complexity to a 
small network of low complexity; its power being based on traditional status 
and not on legal provisions (Pattaya). Traditional authority refers here to the 
fact that the object of obedience is the personal authority of the individual by 
virtue of traditional status; thus, obedience is not owed to enacted rules but to 
the person who occupies a position of authority by tradition (Weber, 1947: 
341). 
• Fails, if the reduction of complexity secedes to a small political economic 
arena, which implements a traditional end-of-pipe approach (Pattani).  
As far as the validity of the present results is concerned, Mohanty (2001: 68) confirms 
the existence of high bureaucratic complexity. She assesses the impacts of the 
implementation of ISO 14001 certified industries in and around the central region of 
Thailand covering 4 major industrial districts and finds shortcomings in regulatory 
requirements, in non-coordinated efforts of different ministries towards the 
environmental problem solving activities, and a lack of knowledge and resources on 
behalf of the authorities.  
Factor b: Unclear legal authority 
The  analysis shows that there is a considerable number of environmentally relevant 
legal provisions that de facto form a ‘market’ which enables the respective policy arena 
to choose and legitimize its approach. These provisions are neither harmonized nor 
hierarchically ordered. Thus, the legal authority is unclear, which leads to non-
implementation of the charge (Pattani), or to conflicts and uncertainty when the charge 
will finally be extended (Pattaya), or to its full implementation (Hat Yai).  
In Hat Yai, the relevant legal provisions are not very clear and are very general. There 
are no other provisions that would guide local authorities and other actors involved in 
user charge implementation. The factories use the vagueness to interpret it in their own 
way by saying that the user charge was not necessary and that they favored the 
condition of the traditional-end-of-pipe approach combined with the traditional fee of 
water consumption. 
In Pattani, the legal complexity has consequences not only for the ownership of the land 
on which CWWTP is built, but also for the management of the utility. The 
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implementation of user charge continues to be tied by three existing legal acts which are 
contested. Since the authority to operate the industrial zone is seemingly beyond the 
scope of PAO regulations, the introduction of user charge failed.  
The legal authority in Pattaya is also characterized by a large array of legal provisions. 
The ‘usurpation of power’ by the small policy arena leads to the application of the 
environmental law and the CWWTP plant being built and operated. But the user charge 
is currently (2004) contested by the association of Hotel owners and a court case has 
been filed claiming the arbitrariness of the user charge extension.  
Factor c: Missing implementation structure and process 
Implementation is a complex process. It deals with the identification of the policy, a set 
of outcomes and the relationship between these two (Lane, 2000: 108). The process 
itself needs to be strategically guided, planned, managed and controlled in order to 
involve changes of actors, responsibilities, roles, goals, functions and allocation of 
resources (among many Diamond, 1996; National Academy of Public Administration, 
2000; Stapleton, Glover and Pettie, 2001).  
In the three cases analyzed, implementation was rather conceived as ‘evolution’ in 
which formulation and implementation are mixed; it was conceived as ‘ambiguity’ in 
the sense that bureaucracy is not sufficiently autonomous from politics. Finally, it has 
been conceived also as a perspective in which different coalitions position themselves. 
Depending on the winning coalition, implementation may lead to user charges (Pattaya, 
Hat Yai) or to symbolic implementation only (Pattani and, according to Bangkok Post 
(2003: 3) many other municipalities).  
The results from two of the case studies (Pattani, Pattaya) show, almost systematically, 
deficits in the implementation process: No actor with clear responsibility objectives and 
strategy is in charge of the implementation process, and no involvement of the target 
public (e.g. companies); No specific information activities (capacity building) such as 
target group oriented seminars and workshops for user groups (i.e., companies) as well 
as for technical experts that will help users to conceive technical innovations. 
Other research has also pointed out implementation deficits. Chokchaitrakulpho (2002: 
56) shows that for over a decade, the Thai government has been promoting cleaner 
production (CP), for example in Samut Prakarn Province (adjacent to Bangkok) which 
is one of the most industrialized and also one of the most polluting provinces in 
Thailand. Some of the CP implementing activities on a voluntary basis has been 
successful. However, according to the author there are still serious environmental, 
institutional, legal, policy and planning problems, as well as implementation deficits 
(structural, organizational, knowledge and skills). The theses from Tungkasmit (2003:  
125f) and Mongkolnchaiarunya (2001: 206f) confirm these findings too. 
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Factor d: User Charge Management 
Successful implementation depends not only on the implementation model that is 
chosen but, once the instrument is implemented, its success depends also on the 
management of the instrument. The management of the user charge itself differs from 
case to case. 
In Pattani (PIZ), the charge has not been implemented. This case has to be considered as 
normal according to TEI (Bangkok Post, 2003: 3); only four municipalities have so far 
successfully implemented the charge. Two of them have been analyzed in this research 
study: Hat Yai and Pattaya. 
In Hat Yai (SIE), the implementation process determined from the very beginning that 
the companies have to sign a contract that commits them to the user charge. No specific 
efforts had been made to share and jointly create a basis of information and common 
understanding of the user charge and its effects on the companies. Since there was a 
lack of clear leadership and no clear indicators, the staff had no direction of where to go 
and what to do. This indeterminate management has the effect that individual members 
of SIE deal with individual companies independently of any common approach or 
strategy, leaving among companies the impression that user charge costing and levying 
was arbitrary. One of the two companies surveyed reports environmentally friendly 
changes due to the user charge. However, its management believes that these changes 
had been triggered by its headquarters and respective environmental company culture in 
Bangkok and not by the user charge implementation in SIE. Thus, environmentally 
relevant effects due to the user charge depend more on the type of company than the 
implementation of user charge by SIE. 
In Pattaya (CoP), the charge was negotiable between SED and the factories. The user 
charge is extended through negotiations on a case by case basis depending on what 
specific approach representatives from CoP/SED has in mind. A court case is pending 
(2004) from a user who feels being treated arbitrary regarding the calculation of the user 
charge. It also remains to be seen how CoP can cover its O&M costs for CWWTP 4. 
Mohanty (2001: 66) and Tungkasmit (2003: 113) come to similar results regarding the 
effectiveness of administrative actions. Mohanty believes that the major driver for 
implementing ISO 14000 is not the administration but the company’s management, in 
particular if it is an international company. Tungkasmit’s research in the famous holiday 
Province of Phuket supports Mohanty’s view and some of our research in the sense that 
implementation of regulations depends less on Thai government rules and regulations 
but very much on pressure from outside, i.e., on mainly tourists and/or company internal 
factors such as efficiency points of view.  
Factor e: New instrument for environmental protection 
The traditional environmental policy in Thailand has at its core the technical end-of-
pipe approach within a structure of top-down command and control. Furthermore, 
environmental awareness is low, not only in society but also among civil servants and 
business – a fact also acknowledged by the Thai Government in 1997. As the case study 
of Pattaya has shown, the traditional approach coupled with low enforcement and low 
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awareness leads to serious environmental degradation and to the introduction of the 
economic instrument ‘user charge’. 
As far as ‘environmental economics’ is concerned, the ‘costs’ for firms have been based 
on cheap (drinking) water and on flat rates for waste water and externalization. The user 
charge approach builds on economic instruments, i.e., with the help of user charges 
companies should be lead to either pay according to their waste water volume and 
pollution, or introduce innovative changes in their input and production process so as to 
reduce the volume and polluting load that is discharged, in order to reduce the charge to 
be paid to those providing the service of waste water treatment. It is characteristic that 
no legal provisions mention the type of charge and costing approach that should be used 
for calculating the charge. Bird (1999a: 4f) argues that there are at least 3 types of user 
charges (service fees, benefit charges or public prices) and 7 approaches to pricing the 
charge
5
 and that from this point of view local authorities as well as well companies have 
been ‘left in the dark’. However, there has been no ‘urgency’ to comply with rules and 
regulations including the implementation of the user charge, for Thailand has a low 
enforcement tradition. 
Factor f: Low enforcement tradition in Thailand 
Thailand has a long history with the low enforcement. In the case of the environment, 
the formal recognition of environmental problems began to take shape only after the 
1997 economic crisis when Thailand’s key policy maker
6
, OEPP from MOSTE, 
acknowledged in its state of the environment report Year 1997 (OEPP, 1998: 8) that 
lack of enforcement has made policies, rules and organizations ineffective. MOSTE 
argued their case further on the problem of unclear legal authority: 1) Thai laws assign 
substantial powers to the executives by allowing the issuance of Ministerial 
Regulations, Notifications and Announcements, thus, the executives have the power to 
lay or reset the rules; and if they cannot promulgate or modify legislation, they can still 
influence those overseeing the implementation of the regulations. Further, 2) 
overlapping legislation may sometimes prevent an authority from enforcing a given law 
for the fear of offending or overstepping the jurisdiction of another agency and causing 
conflict. As a result, influential local business people usually forge strong ties with 
politicians to use the latter’s bureaucratic powers to nurture their own selfish interests 
without regard to the impact on the public good and the environment. Langkarpint’s 
study (2003: 1709) confirmed that throughout the public sector in Thailand, there is 
evidence of corruption and corrupt officials or agents who render law enforcement and 
regulation almost an impossibility (Energy Information Administration, 2003; Delgado, 
Narrod, & Tiongco, 2003; Greenpeace Southeast Asia Foundation, 2004; Wildlife Fund 
Thailand, 2003)  
 
BEYOND CAPACITY BUILDING: TRIPLE PARADIGM SHIFT 
There is no doubt that capacity building is very important for public sector reforms and 
policy changes. However, the authors want to argue that it may reach limits if a triple 
paradigm shift is occurring at one and the same time, for the shift leads to the overload 
of the politico-administrative system. In a first part, the notions of paradigm and policy 
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shift are defined. In a further part, capacity building is presented and the double 
structure of the Thai state is introduced. This structure is the context within which the 
triple paradigm shift takes place.  
Paradigms and policy shifts 
Sabatier has introduced the concepts of advocacy coalition and policy change (Sabatier, 
1998: 113; Sabatier, 1999: 130f). A major policy change is a change in the policy core 
whereas a minor change is a change in the secondary aspects (Sabatier, 1999: 147) of a 
policy only. Policies are carried by advocacy coalitions and are part of their belief 
system (idem):  
• The deep core, i.e., normative and ontological, axioms and values that go 
across all policy systems which are very difficult to change; 
• The policy core, i.e., fundamental policy positions regarding strategies for 
achieving the core values which are sub-system wide and difficult to change; 
The secondary aspects, i.e., instrumental decisions and information to implement policy 
core are usually part of the sub-system and moderately easy to change. In the case of 
Thailand, the user charge introduction is a deep core and a policy core change caused by 
a change in the ruling local coalition. However, the change from one coalition to the 
other often needs a fundamental paradigm shift from a traditional to modern form of 
polity.  
This concept of paradigm is now also used in the context of development (Mürle, 1997: 
20) and public sector reform (Aucoin, 2000: 1). Paradigm refers to a specific pattern of 
thinking and deciding (adapted from Hall, 1993: 276): 
• the values and axioms that lead to selection and definition of problems (deep 
core); 
• the means to resolve the problems (policy core, secondary aspects); 
• the framework within which decisions are taken (polity); 
• the actors forming the elite (coalition of those holding power). 
One might now argue that the notions of policy and policy change are adequate to 
describe and explain the results of user charge implementation or non-
implementation in the three Thai cases, and that there is no need to introduce the 
concept of polity paradigm shift. However, with the notion of paradigm shift the 
authors want to lead away from an approach that focuses on the policy ‘only’ but 
argue that policy shifts are linked with polity shifts. What the authors mean is that a 
paradigm shift is a policy and polity shift that can set limits to capacity building. 
Capacity building 
There is considerable experience with capacity development and organizational change 
processes in many settings (agriculture, education, gender development, private sector, 
poverty alleviation, etc). The following key factors promote capacity development: An 
external environment that is conducive to change; leadership by top management; 
availability of institutional innovations and resources; as well as adequate management 
of the capacity development process (among many Horton, 2002: 8). 
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This type of capacity building is in line with the current shift of development policies. It 
is a change from ‘project support’ to the development of institutions, i.e., the 
establishment of structures and of decision-making mechanisms, which enable the target 
groups to access resources, information and participation, as well as enabling growth 
and welfare (quite similar Kochendörfer-Lucius and Van der Sand, 2000; Plummer, 
2000). Hilderbrand and Grindle’s (1997: 34f) conditions for public sector capacity are 
merit in recruitment and promotion, effective performance of agencies, and fair and 
well-established rules in relationships between the bureaucracy and other institutions. 
Capacity building can specifically focus on managerial functions such as financial, 
human resources and strategic management and it can focus on organizational learning 
and on external relations (among many Eade, 1997; Horton, 2002; UNDP, 1998).  
However, capacity building seems to have its limits too. New Zealand’s State Service 
Commission argues, though vaguely, that the implementation of the Policy and 
Expenditure Management Systems failed and was not a suitable model for New 
Zealand, that ‘ (…) the system depended on too many new advances in government 
planning …’ (State Service Commission, 2000: 7) and similarly Mongkolnchaiarunya 
(2001: 210f) is concerned that the Thai local administrative system may be ‘overloaded’ 
by introducing urban environmental management within a process of decentralization.  
The Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific does not take into account the 
overloading in its recent research on capacity in Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and 
Vietnam (2001). The researchers ‘measure’ state capacity, the principal indicators are 
elite stability and public legitimacy; in the case of policy capacity, the main focus is on 
policy coherence and the ability to frame realistic, credible and consistent strategic 
goals; and in the case of administrative capacity, the factors highlighted are those that 
enhance or inhibit the effectiveness of the machinery of government and of 
administrative processes more generally for putting into effect these goals. While 
Malaysia is considered having good capacities for carrying out reforms, in other 
countries e.g., those of Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia are estimated to be low. The 
very instructive research report does not provide answers to how, where and in what 
sequence the capacity building should be done and it also overlooks limits of capacity 
building. The major barrier – the authors of this paper believe – is the triple paradigm 
shift that should take place if, for example, the will of new Thai Constitution was 
followed. 
 
THE TRIPLE PARADIGM SHIFT 
In this section the article will assess the three paradigm shifts that should occur: 
• from an autocratic organic polity to a modern, democratic polity; 
• from command-and-control technology based, to economic instruments of 
intervention; 
• from central to decentralized arrangement of central-local relations
7
.  
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 6  ·  Issue 1  ·  2005  ·  © International Public Management Network 
47 
 
First paradigm shift: From autocratic to democratic polity 
The Thai bureaucratic system has the following distinctive features (Research Institute 
for Asia and the Pacific (RIAP), 2001: 71): 
• Hierarchical status: to a considerable degree, the bureaucracy is organized and 
operated to reflect differential status considerations.  
• Personalism: personal relationships and individual concerns remain the basis 
for bureaucratic behavior and thus protect system membership.  
• Arrogance and disdain for those outside the system: there is a belief that one 
can define for others what is in their best interest.  
• Paternalism: there is a real desire to care for one’s subordinates.  
• Security: well understood norms guide behavior and thus protect system 
membership, etc. 
This characterization of Thai bureaucracy is adequate, but what is overlooked by the 
RIAP research study is its functioning within a very specific structure of the state
8
. 
Thailand has in principle all the ingredients that allow for a modern democratic state: It 
is pluralistic, has checks and balances and institutions like government, parliament, 
administration, courts and free media; furthermore a modern constitution and legal 
provisions for most policy areas. In this paradigm there are two important distinctions 
of spheres: That (i) between public and private spheres, i.e., the recognition that there is 
a domain where the public interest has to prevail and that this public interest has to be 
free from individual private interests’ interference. This distinction also implies that the 
public domain has to be regulated by specific legal principles, and that the actors 
performing within this public sphere are subject to these principles. The second 
distinction (ii) between politics and administration: Politics is based on public 
confidence expressed in free political elections. Administration is based on the rule of 
law, the merit and professional capability of civil servants.  
In a traditional state the distinctions between (i) public and private and between (ii) 
politics and administration are often blurred. 
Traditional authority overrules legitimate 
authority. In many South East Asian countries, 
so the hypothesis goes, policy shifts often take 
place within two embedded paradigms. On the 
one hand the paradigm of a traditional 
autocratic-paternalistic system of ruling, on the 
other the paradigm of legitimate authority (Western model of rule of law and 
governance). Governments have left ‘(…) the door open for abuses as large businesses 
with strong access conducted their own deals with the Government’ (Wescott, 2001: 
43). Decisions and behavior in this organic state and society are status oriented within 
society and within the bureaucratic system: in Box 5, the two case studies (Pattaya, 
Pattani) show that modern elements of legitimate authority are embedded within 
traditional authority. Economy and society are considered by traditional elites as 
integral and organic parts of the wider state (see also Cheung, 2001: 18). In Pattani and 
Pattaya planning, construction and operating central waste water treatment plants as 
well as the choice of the policy had been captured by the local political economic elite 
with no or limited public participation in decision making. 
Box 5: Case studies and double state 
 
Case/polity Traditional Modern 
Hat Yai   
Pattani   
Pattaya   
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Second paradigm shift: From command-and-control to economic intervention 
The deep core of the environmental policy in Thailand consists of an instrumental use 
of the environment. Nature and the environment have a low value
9
: Environmental 
awareness is low in society, among civil servants and business. Furthermore, Thailand 
has low enforcement tradition of legal provisions (OEPP, 1998: 8). The old 
environmental policy core is the technical end-of-pipe approach within a structure of 
top-down command and control; secondary aspects like technical and effluent standards 
and monitoring concepts exist. The new approach is using economic instruments which 
are new to all major actors, especially to local authorities. 
The paradigm shift to economic instruments, i.e., valuing the environment, is difficult 
for all actors involved. In this case Thailand has to be given the benefit of belonging to 
the pioneers, for the EU has difficulties with these instruments (Jordan, Wurzel & Zito, 
2000), often, the difficulties in applying economic instruments have given rise to 
voluntary programs (Daley, 2002; May, 2002; Thomas, 2002).  
The user charge itself is not without difficulties either. Rationale and principles of 
design seem to be clear; it should be applied wherever possible Bird (1999a: 2). 
However, Bird (1994: 30) states that administratively such a system requires a clear set 
or ‘framework’ of laws, i.e., of instruments like local budgeting, financial reporting, 
taxation, contracting, dispute settlement, rules to be followed in designing user charges, 
as well as adequate institutional support for localities to operate in this environment. 
Bird (1999a: 10) warns that it is surprisingly difficult to implement well in practice. The 
case studies proved this, for the framework of laws and institutional support in form of 
knowledge and expertise in Thailand were missing. Last but not least, Bardach (1977: 
180) is confirmed in the sense that it takes much longer than the program implementers 
thought to produce outcomes.  It will take even more time if there is a triple shift of 
paradigm, one of them including a change coupled with a change in polity. 
Results from Mongkolnchaiarunya (2001: 215) confirm our argumentation on the 
double paradigm shift. He concludes that the introduction of UEM and three alternative 
solid waste management projects based on economic returns was difficult despite the 
support from the Mayor and Deputy Mayor. There was no clear organizational structure 
to manage the projects. These were managed by specific persons without any formal 
structural support; the inertia of municipal bureaucratic system prevailed in the form of 
a ‘free rider’ attitude. The inertia was also enforced by the very strong tradition of status 
orientation. Social and professional roles were not adapted to the participatory 
approach. Finally, the projects were carried out within the new perspective of 
introducing urban environmental management at the local level. However, another shift 
of paradigm took place at the same time: that of decentralization. Hence, the success of 
the projects is moderate; two have been more or less cancelled. 
Third paradigm shift: From Central to decentralized government 
Present paradigms propagate development strategies such as (ADB, 1998; Bevir and 
Rhodes, 2001; Mürle, 1997; World Bank, 1992) good governance, participation and 
decentralization
10
. In this final paragraph the authors deal with an issue that was not part 
of their empirical research; the implementation of the user charge started well before the 
decentralization process. However, one can assume that decentralization will play a role 
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in the implementation of the user charge in those municipalities that have not yet 
implemented it. Furthermore, current research results from Thailand show that 
decentralization poses considerable problems (see below). Finally, most of the countries 
in South East Asia (Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia and 
Indonesia) as well as China are engaged in public sector reform and decentralization 
processes as well as reforming existing and introducing new policies (see for example 
Jones, Guthrie & Steane, 2001; Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific, 2003; 
Wescott, 2000 and 2001). 
There is common consensus on the aims of decentralization: strengthening sub-national 
entities to increase effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, control of power of 
politicians and administration, increasing accountability as well as creating ‘ownership’ 
of program and projects. Further aims are the protection of minorities and allowing for 
more flexibility and profit from innovations (among many Steinich, 1997: 4). 
Decentralization means more than the delegation of political, fiscal and administrative 
power to lower levels of authorities, it includes the participation of the private sector 
and of civil society in the management of local matters. This is also what the Thai 
Constitution of 1997 and subsequent Thai Governments pledged to do. 
Thailand has had a period of changes. Since 1932 it has had 15 constitutions and 17 
military coups. In 1997 Parliament adopted a new constitution and subsequently the 
Decentralization Act in 1999 along with the formation of the National Decentralization 
Commission. The new Constitution is committed to local government (Chapter IX, 
Sections 282-290), to local self-government according to the will of the people in the 
cases of policy-making, administration, personnel administration, and finances 
(Sections 282): 
• At the structural level the 3-tier system has been maintained. The upgrading to 
municipal level – our area of interest – results in having 1,131 Municipalities. 
• At the functional level, formerly exclusive functions of the central government 
are delegated to the local authorities such as democracy and participation, 
infrastructure, planning, investment promotion, tourism and industrial 
development, management and conservation of natural resources and the 
environment.  
• The financial decentralization includes revenue and expenditure 
decentralization and the local authorities are empowered to manage local 
financial resources (e.g. levy user charges). 
The decentralization process is creating considerable problems for local authorities. 
They have to: 
• Assume new tasks like planning, managing, revenue raising and controlling 
and new roles in form of managers, facilitators, entrepreneurs and mediators; 
• Be responsible and accountable for their decisions; this is an arduous task, 
since decentralization inevitably leads to localization of political conflicts; in 
other words responsibility for conflict cannot be referred to the national level 
as before decentralization. 
Current research shows that decentralization in Thailand is far from a clear cut process. 
Bowornwathana (2000: 393-408) is critical about the Governance reform in Thailand 
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and questions its assumptions and approaches; Nelson (2001a: 1) is in line with 
Bowornwathana when he disapproves of the lack of popular participation in Thailand. 
Nelson (2001b: 4) also analyses the ongoing decentralization process and stipulates that 
it is not clear what the term ‘localities’ mean in the Thai constitution, and points out that 
the new Government of Prime Minster Thaksin intervenes in the decentralization 
process initiated by his predecessor which leads to uncertainty and confusion. (Ibid: 6f; 
Wescott, 2001: 43) and project failure at municipality level. Mongkolnchaiarunya 
(2001: 216) shows that within the context of decentralization the introduction of three 
small waste management projects with a participatory component is very difficult in a 
Thai city that has already a long-standing excellent record of waste management. He 
concludes that local authorities have not been clear about their new tasks and 
responsibilities such as urban environmental management. 
The authors of this paper believe that decentralization in Thailand is not simply a 
‘delegation’ of tasks from central to local levels; it means a complex paradigm shift 
with multiple changes: 
• Values and axioms that guide problem definition and decision modes: A shift 
from the traditional polity paradigm of an organic political-economic 
corporation to a new concept of polity that separates public and private 
spheres, and allows for public participation public too. This implies that those 
who have power in the form of an economic-political corporation have to give 
up political power in favor of citizens. 
• The means to solve problems and conflicts: The policy core is no longer 
defined by strongmen (god-fathers) and their links to national levels by 
practicing what serves them in any given situation. Public authorities have to 
shift to a paradigm in which they mobilize values of self-administration, 
formulate and implement public instead of private policies, assume democratic 
responsibility and accountability instead of relying on traditional authority. 
• Finally the change of secondary aspects: Local authorities are no longer 
executing agencies of central government, but are responsible for planning and 
managing administrative structures, strategies and standards themselves. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
User charge implementation is difficult. In two of the three case studies the charge has 
been implemented, nevertheless, the results are incomplete due to pending court cases 
and legal uncertainty (See the summary of initial complexity in Box 6 below). 
Furthermore, in Thailand herself, the charge has so far only been implemented in four 
municipalities.  
   Box 6: Summary of initial cmplexity and implementation success  
 
                                               
Hat Yai 
User charge 
implemented 
Pattani 
Implementation 
incomplete 
Pattaya 
Extension pending 
Initial bureaucratic complexity low high high 
Initial legal complexity medium high high 
Initial implementation complexity low medium high 
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Bureaucratic and legal complexities are high in two of the three cases. They are reduced 
in two cases by local political economic arenas that have the characteristics of 
traditional authority as defined by Max Weber (see above). This polity co-exists with 
modern democratic structures and procedures. The respective local arena chooses the 
legal provisions and waste water costing approach that suits its purposes best.   
One traditional arena (Pattaya) has started the extension of the user charge; the other 
(Pattani) has chosen the end-of-pipe approach based on a water consumption fee in 
which the degree of the pollution of the waste water plays no role. Hat Yai has a modern 
polity approach based on contractual law. Its policy implementation focuses on 
outcomes while Pattani and Pattaya opt for managing the chosen option through. 
The management of the user charge is difficult in Pattaya and Hat Yai: This new 
instrument is not systematically introduced to the companies for there is no clear 
implementation program, and the costing depends on personal relations between civil 
servants and individual companies. It is not clear what effects the user charge produces, 
for the extension in Pattaya is stalled due to a pending court case; in Hat Yai one small 
company signals no effects while a large company attributes the changes in the 
production process to company headquarters culture rather than to the user charge. In 
the case of Pattani and its end-of-pipe approach, the companies are not yet connected to 
CWWTP. Some do pre-treatment, others do not have enough capacity and discharge 
their waste water untreated.  
If one takes into account the implementation of other environmentally relevant projects 
carried out in Thailand, then there are factors other than bureaucratic and legal 
complexity and managerial problems that also account for implementation difficulties. 
There is the low law enforcement tradition and above all the triple paradigm shift that 
authorities have to perform: A shift in polity, i.e., from traditional to modern state 
authority; a shift in relations, i.e., from central to decentralized participatory public 
sector management; finally a shift from command-and-control intervention to the use of 
market instruments such as the user charge. All shifts carried out at one and the same 
time lead to an ‘over-load’ of the political-administrative system that cannot be 
‘compensated’ by capacity building alone. In this configuration, power has to be given 
up by the political economic elites. Furthermore, the authors of this paper plead for 
sequential policy shifts: Decentralization itself is already a difficult task; the 
implementation of new policy instruments may follow later. 
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NOTES
                                                 
1
 Bird (1999b: 7) defines user charges as service fees, benefit charges or public prices 
(the case of Thailand). They should be applied whenever possible at local level, though 
the implementation is difficult (1999a: 2).  
2
 This is also true for other countries of the Region, which mostly have neither a policy 
tradition nor a tradition of policy research. 
3
 Hotels and condominiums account for more than 70 percent of the City’s tax revenue. 
4
 Complexity designates the degree of differentiation of a system (network, 
organization) and the number of levels, the type and degree of interdependency as well 
as the degree and weight of outcomes of a ‘decision-making’ arrangement (based on 
Willke (1993: 24f).  
5
 Approaches to pricing the charge: Marginal costs, short-run or long-run marginal 
costs, average cost pricing, average incremental cost pricing, multi-part tariffs, variable 
block pricing (Bird, 1999a: 4f). 
6
 OEPP has renamed to the Office of the Natural Resources and Environmental Policy 
and Planning when the MOSTE became the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment (MoNRE). 
7
 The authors follow this order of presentation for decentralization was not part of the 
empirical research. 
8
 The argument on Thai Governance in Thailand indicated that while transparency and 
accountability had long been pillars of public governance in the West, in Asia the webs 
of power and money remain largely hidden from public view. (Anand Panyarachun, 
former Prime Minister of Thailand, in ADB, 1999: cover page). 
9
 Environmental costs for firms have been in-existent or low, based on cheap (drinking) 
water consumption and on flat rates for waste water. Often waste water is simply 
discharged into rivers, lakes and the sea.  
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